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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JULIE M. CHILD, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
THE BOARD OF REVIEW OF THE 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
UTAH, 
Case No. 18169 
Defendant-Respondent. 
DEFENDANT'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action before the Supreme Court of the State of Utah pursuant 
to Section 35-4-lO{i), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, seeking judicial 
review of a decision of the Board of Review of the Industrial Commission of 
Utah, affinning the decision of an Appeal Referee which denied benefits to 
the claimant, Julie M. Child, effective August 16, 1981, pursuant to Section 
35-4-5{a), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended {Pocket Supplement, 1979), 
on the grounds that the claimant voluntarily left work without good cause. 
1 
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DISPOSITION BELOW 
Plaintiff, Julie M. Child (hereinafter referred to as claimant), was 
denied unemployment benefits effective August 16, 1981, by a Department 
Representative pursuant to Section 35-4-5(a), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
amended (Pocket Supplement, 1979) (hereinafter referred to as the Act), on 
the grounds she voluntarily left work without good cause. (R.0039) The 
claimant appealed to an Appeal Referee who affirmed the decision to deny 
benefits by a decision dated October 14, 1981. (R.0023-0024) Upon further 
appeal, the Board of Review affirmed the decision of the Appeal Referee by 
decision issued December 4, 1981, in Case No. 81-A-3663, 81-BR-352. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON REVIEW 
Claimant seeks a reversal of the Board of Review's decision denying 
unemployment benefits. Defendant seeks affirmance of such decision. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 




THAT IN REVIEWING DETERMINATIONS OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
UNDER THE UTAH EMPLOYMENT SECURITY ACT THE COURT WILL AFFIRM 
THE Fl.NDINGS OF THE BOARD OF REVIEW IF SUCH ARE SUSTAINED BY 
SUBSTANTIAL COMPETENT EVIDENCE. 
The standard of review in unemp 1 oyment insurance cases is we 11 estab-
1 i shed. Section 35-4-lO(i), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provides in part: 
2 
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In any judicial proceedings under this section the find-
ings of the Commission and the Board of Review as to the 
facts if supported by evidence shall be conclusive and 
the jurisdiction of said Court shall be confined to ques-
tions of law. 
This Court has consistently held that where the findings of the Commis-
sion and the Board of Review are supported by evidence, they will not be 
disturbed. Martinez v. Board of Review, 25 U. 2d 131, 477 P. 2d 587 (1970). 
In analyzing the above-referenced review provision, this Court has stated: 
Under Section 35-4-lO(i) the role of this Court is to 
sustain the determination of the Board of Review unless 
the record clearly and persuasively proves the action of 
the Board of Review was arbitrary, capricious, and un-
reasonable. Specifically, as a matter of law, the deter-
mination was wrong; because only the opposite conclusion 
could be drawn from the facts. Continental Oil Company 
v. Board of Review of the Industrial Commission of Utah, 
(Utah, 1977) 568 P. 2d 727, 729. ' 
POINT 11 
THE COMMISSION DID NOT ERR IN DETERMINING THAT CLAIMANT VOL-
UNTARILY LEFT WORK WITHOUT GOOD CAUSE. 
Section 35-4-5(a), Utah Code Annotated, 1953 (Pocket Supplement, 1979) 
provides: 
5. An individual shall be ineligible for benefits or for 
purposes of establishing a waiting period: 
(a) For the week in which the claimant left work volun-
tarily without good cause, if so found by the commission, 
and for each week thereafter until the claimant has per-
formed services in bona fide covered employment and earn-
ed wages for such services equal to at least six times 
the claimant's weekly benefit amount; provided, that no 
claimant shall be ineligible for benefits if the claimant 
leaves work under circumstances of such a nature that it 
would be contrary to equity and good conscience to impose 
a disqualification. 
3 
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The commission shall in cooperation with the employer 
consider for the purposes of this act, the reasonableness 
of the claimant's actions, and the extent to which the 
actions evidence a genuine continuing attachment to the 
labor market in reaching a determination of whether the 
ineligibility of a claimant is contrary to equity and 
good conscience. 
This Court has previously held that the purpose of the Employment Secu-
rity Act is 'to assist a worker and his family in times when he is out of work 
without fault on his part. Kennecott Copper Corporation Employees v. Depart-
ment of Employment Security, 13 U. 2d 262, 372 P. 2d 987 (1962); and that the 
Department is to determine a claimant's eligibility for unemployment compen-
sation by adhering to the volitional test. 01 af Nelson Construction Company 
v. The Industrial Commission, 121 U. 521, 243 P. 2d 951 (1952); Mills v. 
--
Gronning, (Utah, 1978) 581 P. 2d 1334. 
The issue in the instant case is a relatively simple one. Is a claimant 
entitled to unemployment benefits after voluntarily leaving work to accompany 
her spouse to a new area in order for the spouse to attend school?. 
Defendant substantfally agrees with the definition of "good cause" as 
set forth in.Plaintiff's Brief, pages 5-6. The definition of "good cause" 
may be summarized by the quotation included in Pl ai nti ff' s Brief from the 
l 
case of Denby v. Board of Review of the Industrial Commission, 567 P. 2d 626 
(Utah l 977): 
"Good cause" has been defined as "such cause as would 
similarly affect persons of reasonable and normal sensi-
tivity, and is limited to those instances where the 
unemployment is caused by external pressures so compel-
ling that a reasonably prudent person, exercising ordin-
ary common sense and prudence, would be justified in 
quitting under similar circumstances." (Citation omit-
ted, emphasis added) 
4 
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In the instant case it is undisputed that the reason for the claimant's vol-
untary leaving was to accompany her spouse to California in order for him to 
attend law school. It is well established that quitting work to attend 
school is not good cause. General Rules of Adjudication, Voluntary Leaving, 
Section 40; Norton v. Department of Employment Security, 22 U. 2d 24, 447 P. 
2d 907 (1968); Townsend v. Board- of Review, 27 U. 2d 94, 493 P. 2d 614 
(1972); Schultz v. Board of Review, 606 P. 2d 254 (Utah, 1980). This Court 
has not had prior opportunity to rule on the specific issue presented in the 
instant case, that is, whether a claimant who quits to follow her husband in 
order for him to attend school does so with good cause. The position of the 
Commission is strightforward: The policy of the State that leaving work to 
attend school is not good cause should be extended to the claimant who leaves 
work to accompany his/her spouse in order for the spouse to attend school. 
It should be noted that the rules and cases cited by claimant in sup-
port of her position in this case pertain primarily to leaving work to 
accompany a spouse when the spouse has other employment at the new location. 
Claimant does not cite any cases which allow benefits to a claimant who quits 
to accompany a spouse to a new area where the spouse begins attending school. 
The reason for this is readily ascertainable. As stated in the Denby deci-
sfon, a quit is with good cause when that quit is motivated by external 
pressures so compelling that a reasonable, prudent person would be justified 
in quitting. In the instant case claimant alleges that such compelling cir-
cumstances existed in her need to preserve the family relationship. Yet that 
need only arose through the personal desire of the claimant's spouse to at-
tend law school. Such personal reasons ·are certainly not "external pressures 
5 
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so compelling" as to constitute good cause. In this regard the claimant's 
statement that a denial of benefits would mean the only compelling reason 
for quitting to accompany a spouse would be when that spouse has other work 
in the new area is not a correct statement of policy or the 1 aw. Personal 
reasons may exist which compel an individual to leave work and move to 
a new area, without having a 1 ready secured new work, such as a need to care 
for an i 11 family member or other circumstances which constitute 1 egi timate 
external pressures to which a reasonably prudent person would respond. Thus, 
it may be said that "external compelling" circumstances are those circum-
stances which originate outside of the control of the claimant or as in the 
instant case outside of the control of the claimant's spouse. When the 
claimant's unemployment becomes the result of her own volitional action, or 
that of her spouse, good cause may not be found to exist. 
The foregoing analysis of good cause finds support in the reasoning of 
a Superior Court of Pennsylvania in the case of Bl i 1 ey Electric Company v. 
Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 158 Pa. Super. 548, 45 A. 2d 898, 
903 (1946). In the Bliley case the Court explained good cause in terms which 
are now we 11 known and consistent with most juri sdi cti ons. The Court then 
went on to apply its definition of good cause to the situation of a married 
woman who leaves her work to join or accompany her husband, as follows: 
When we approach the problem of a married woman who 
leaves her work to join her husband we realize immedi-
ately that we are in the presence of a compulsion which 
readily supplies a personal reason and a good cause. 
Under our law, it is the legal right of the husband to 
select the marital domicile and it is the legal duty of 
the wife to reside with him. Hence, when a husband moves 
the marital domicile to a distant point where he secures 
work and his wife voluntarily leaves her work to accompa-
ny him, her compliance with the duty which the law casts 
upon her satisfies the requirement of "good cause." 
6 
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On the other hand, joining a husband at a distant point 
may not always constitute good cause for a wife's leav-
ing her employment. Obviously, a wife joining her hus-
band who is enjoying an extended vacation, would not be justified in leaving her employment, unless per chance 
a serious illness required her attendance upon him. A 
husband may take a temporary or transient job in another 
locality without changing the marital domicile; in that 
case, no other circumstances appearing, a wife would not 
be justified in leaving her employment. The nature of 
the circumstances in each individual case, the strength 
and effect of the compulsive pressure of external and 
objective forces must be evaluated, and if they are suf-
ficiently potent, they become relevant and controlling 
factors. 
The Court in Bliley found the claimant had good cause to leave work and join 
her husband in another state. However, in that case the claimant's husband 
had been transferred to the other state by the military. In the instant case 
the claimant's reason for leaving work to accompany her husband was solely to 
be with him whi 1 e attending school. Thus, compulsive pressure of external 
and objective forces, referred to in the Bliley decision, simply do not 
appear in the instant case. 
POINT llI 
THE COMMISSION DID NOT ERR IN ITS REFUSAL TO APPLY THE PROVI-
SIONS OF EQUITY AND GOOD CONSCIENCE TO THE FACTS OF THE CLAIM-
ANT'S CASE, AND SUCH DETERMINATION IS SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL 
EVIDENCE. 
Claimant contends that even if good cause is not established for the 
claimant's voluntary leaving of employment, it would be contrary to equity 
and good conscience to deny benefits under Sec ti on 5{ a} of the Act. The 
basis of the claimant's contention in this regard is that the remedial pur-
pose of the Act to provide a cushion to the shock and rigors of unemployment 
7 
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ba 1 ances in favor of a 11 owance of benefits and that the claimant 1 s decision 
to leave work was reasonable to preserve the marital relationship with her 
spouse. 
The General Rules of Adj udi ca ti on, Voluntary Leaving, Sec ti on 210, ex-
plains the application of equity and good conscience, in part, as follows: 
If it is determined that "good cause" does not exist, 
then the surrounding circumstances must be reviewed to 
determine whether the claimant's actions were such that 
a disqualification under this section of law would be 
contrary to equity and good conscience. The statute 
requires that three factors be considered in making a 
determination of whether equity and good conscience re-
quired the disqualification to be abated: 
1. The purposes of the Employment Security Act. 
2. The reasonableness of the claimant's actions; and 
3. The extent to which the claimant's actions evidence 
a genuine attachment to the labor market. 
The Defendant does not dispute that the claimant evidenced a genuine 
attachment to the labor market by reason of her efforts to find work after 
relocatfng in California. However, the claimant's decision to leave work 
was not reasonable either under the remedial nature of the act or in her 
desire to preserve the marital relationship. As noted in the claimant's 
Brief, at page 13, the purpose of the Employment Security Act is: 
[R]emedial to protect the health, morals and welfare of 
the people by providing a cushion against the shock and 
rigors of unemployment. Being remedial under the police 
powers and not imposing limitations on basic rights, it 
should be liberally construed. Singer Sewing Machine 
Company v. Industrial Commission, 134 P. 2d 479, 485, ( Ota h, 1943 • 
As previously noted herein this Court has also held that the purpose of the 
Employment Security Act is to assist a worker and his family in times when 
8 
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he is out of work without fay,l t on his part, and that the Department is to 
determine a claimant's eligibility for unemployment compensation by adhering 
to the volitional test. It is apparent from the fact that the Legislature 
did not eliminate the "at fault" concept in unemployment cases, that the 
Legislature mu st have intended a me 1 ding or b 1 ending of the fault concept 
with the purpose of maintaining purchasing power in the community when an 
individual becomes unemployed by reason of a voluntary quit, but under miti-
gating circumstances. For that reason, the commission is required to also 
look at the reasonableness of the claimant's actions under the circumstances 
as well as whether the claimant has evidenced a genuine continuing attach-
ment to the labor market. 
In the instant case the claimant contends that her actions were reason-
able and required in order to preserve the family relationship. As stated 
by the claimant in her Brief, at page 14, " ••• it is not conceivable that 
a successful marriage could exist with the partners permanently residing in 
different states." (Emphasis added) Claimant offers no explanation why she 
would have been required to permanently reside in Utah whi 1 e her husband 
attended law school in California. Obviously, alternatives were available to 
the claimant other than simply quitting her work on August 14, 1981. Such 
alternatives could have included a search for work in California during a 
vacation period or with a leave of absence from her Utah employer, prior to 
her terminating her employment and moving to California. 
Although the State of Washington, as cited by the claimant in her Brief, 
and other ju ri sd i ct ions have chosen to a 11 ow unemp 1 oyment benefits as a 
matter of state policy to aid in the preservation of the marital relationship 
9 
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when one's spouse leaves the area and the other must ~uit work to accompany 
the. spouse, not all states have adopted such a policy. For instance, Penn-
sylvania, Alabana, Louisianna, Montana, New York, South Carolina and Virginia 
hold that leaving work to accompany a spouse is not good cause. See Annota-
tion, 13 ALR 2d 876. According to a Massachusetts Court, the Courts of New 
Jersey, New York and Pennsylvania had held that family obligations could 
justify leaving a job, but the Legislature in each of those states nullified 
the effect of the Court decisions by amending their statutes. Raytheon Com-. 
pany v. Dirctor of Division of Employment Security, 196 N.E. 2d 196 {Mass., 
1964). In the case of Ayers v. Employment Security Department, 536 P. 2d 610 
__,_..... 
(Wash. 1975), cited by claimant in her Brief, Hamilton, Associate Justice, 
dissented, stating: 
In our mobile society and economy it is not uncommon on 
change of employment cites or locations for families to 
be temporarily separated, all without adverse effect 
upon the family relationship. There is no evidence what-
soever in this case that the temporary separation which 
would have been involved would have threatened the mar-
riage, upset the domestic tranquility, or othewise cause 
any unreasonable inconvenience. 
Although the foregoing statement is found in a dissent and may not be consid-
ered as having the same force and effect as the holding of the Ayers case, it 
states very well the position of the commission in cases such as the instant 
matter. 
It may al so be noted that the position of the commission with respect 
to the issue herein is not inconsistent with legislative intent, as evidenced 
by a recent amendment to Section 5(a) of the Act in which the 1982 Session 
of the Utah Legislature has denied benefits to a claimant who leaves work~ 
accompany a spouse. (Senate Bill 68, 1982 Budget Session.) While this most 
10 
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recent amendment is not cited as the law applicable to the instant case, it 
does evidence the intent of the Legislature with respect to the question 
herein presented. 
CONCLUSION 
The denial of benefits in this case is consistent with the legislative 
intent underlying the Utah Employment Security Act and the decision of the 
commission is supported by substantial competent evidence. It should, there-
fore, be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted this day of April, 1982. 
--
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General of Utah 
FLOYD G. AST! N 





Special Assistant Attorney General 
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